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1 Introduction
We present a framework where search and matching frictions in the
labor market interact with the dynamics of the number of rms and
their strategic behavior. Market structures are said to be endogenous
since the number of producers and the price mark ups are determined
both in the short and in the long run.
Three stylized facts motivate this paper: the large fraction of job
creation (destruction) in the U.S. economy due to the birth (death) of
rms, the procyclical variations in the number of market competitors
and in aggregate prots, and the countercyclicality of price mark ups.2
We consider an economy with distinct sectors, each one characterized
by many rms supplying goods that can be imperfectly substitutable to a
di¤erent degree. As in Colciago and Etro (2010 a and b), we take strate-
gic interactions into account and allow rms within a sector to compete
either in prices (Bertrand competition) or in quantities (Cournot com-
petition). Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and
Melitz (2007) (BGM 2007 henceforth), entry is subject to sunk entry
costs and a time-to-build lag. The free entry condition equates the ex-
pected present discounted value of prots to the sunk cost to endogenize
the number of rms in each sector. As a result the degree of market
power, measured as the mark up that rms can impose over marginal
costs, depends endogenously on the form of competition, on the degree of
substitutability between goods and on the number of rms in the sector.
Firms are large, since they employ multiple-workers and the labor mar-
ket is characterized by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)-style search and
matching frictions. Workers may separate from a job for two reasons:
either because the rm where the job is located exits from the market
or because the match is destroyed. As a consequence, we can identify
the contribution to job creation coming from the birth of rms and the
contribution to job destruction due to the exit of rms from the mar-
ket. Further, and di¤erently from the standard labor search model, the
endogeneity of the number of producers, together with the large rms
assumption, allows to realistically distinguish between the dynamics of
the number of producers and that of employment.
This set up delivers two sets of results. First, in line with the facts
discussed above, new entrants give a sizeable contribution to job cre-
ation and grow faster than more mature producers. Further, prots
are procyclical and price mark ups are countercyclical. Second, without
resorting to rigidities in wages (real or nominal) or prices, and under
2As in Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) we use the terms new rm and new com-
petitors in a broad sense. They refer to both start ups and to new establishments.
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a conservative and standard calibration of parameters, our framework
substantially outperforms the basic search and matching model at repli-
cating the observed variability of the unemployment rate, vacancies and
market tightness.
Both outcomes are the result of a novel propagation mechanism of
technology shocks.3 A rise in technology initially increases prots, which
leads to entry of new rms. Since rmscreation requires output, in-
cumbent rms increase their labor demand both at the intensive and at
the extensive margin. The need to hire workers boosts vacancy posting
on impact. As new entrants start producing, vacancy posting and job
creation are further amplied with respect to a model with exogenous
market structures. Also, as the goodsmarket becomes more crowded,
the relative price of existing varieties rises. At the same time, stronger
competition leads to a lower mark up and thus to a higher demand by
consumers. Both e¤ects provide rms with an incentive to create vacan-
cies which is absent in a model with exogenous market structures. The
responses of the job nding rate and the vacancy lling rate are similarly
amplied.
This dynamics translates into a response of the unemployment rate
in the period after the shock which is almost three times larger, and
more persistent, than that observed in a search model with exogenous
market structures but identical calibration. Importantly, our framework
generates countercyclical mark ups together with procyclical prots and
matches the time pattern of the correlation between output and the
mark up identied in the literature (see e.g. BGM (2007) and Colciago
and Etro (2010)). Turning to second moments, we nd that endogenous
market structures magnify the volatility of unemployment, hours, va-
cancies and the job market tightness in response to a technology shock.
For this reason, we argue that a model where the market structure is
endogenous helps alleviating the so called Shimer (2005) puzzle.
In the long run, stronger competition in the goods market leads to
lower unemployment and to higher real wages. The endogenous steady
state share of gross job creation due to new rms is 25 percent and the
share of overall employment due to startups equals 2.5 percent. These
gures are in line with U.S. averages. Haltiwanger et al. (2009) con-
sider U.S. annual data between 1992 and 2005. They nd that business
startups account for roughly 3 percent of U.S. total employment in any
given year. While this is a reasonably small share of the stock, it is large
relative to net job creation which averages around 2.2 percent of total
3With minor di¤erences in the explanation, the propagation mechanism we de-
scribe applies to any output-expanding shock.
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employment per year.4 Also, Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) on the ba-
sis of U.S. manufacturing data between 1972 and 1986 estimate that 25
percent of annual gross job creation is due to new establishments births.
Similarly, Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) focus on employment data at
the establishment level. They estimate that the average fraction of quar-
terly job-gain (losses) that can be explained by the opening (closing) of
establishments is about 20 percent.
Finally, we show that the interaction between endogenous market
structures and search and matching frictions generates time varying
wedges between the competitive equilibrium allocation and the socially
e¢ cient one. The time-varying nature of price mark up distorts both
the allocation of the intensive and the extensive margin of labor. More-
over, since new entrants need to build up a workforce at the beginning
of their activity, they su¤er lower prots and are characterized by a
lower value with respect to incumbent producers. We show that this
asymmetry distorts the allocation of consumption across di¤erent dates.
Importantly, the Hosios (1990) condition is necessary but not su¢ cient
to achieve e¢ ciency in the allocation of the extensive margin of labor.
In particular, the competitive equilibrium allocation is characterized by
under-employment under both Cournot and Bertrand competition even
when the Hosios condition is satised.
There is convincing macroeconomic evidence in support of the busi-
ness cycle implications of our approach. Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008)
document that around a third of the cyclical volatility of the job-gains
(losses) comes from opening (closing) of establishments, which suggests
that the dynamics of the number of market competitors is a relevant
explanatory variable for the dynamics of job creation (destruction) and
thus of unemployment. The strongly procyclical response of the job nd-
ing probability delivered by our model is consistent with the evidence in
Hall (2005) who, using post-war data, nds that periods of boom, when
the unemployment rate decreases, are associated to a high probability of
nding a job.5 In line with our results Davis et al. (2009) nd that the
vacancy lling probability is strongly countercyclical. An early reference
on the procyclicality of rmsentry in the U.S. is Chatterjee and Cooper
(1993), while a more recent one is Bergin and Corsetti (2008). Portier
(1995) reports a similar pattern for France. Bils (1987), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) and Galì et al. (2007) document price mark ups coun-
tercyclicality. Campbell and Hopenayn (2005) and Martins et al. (1996)
4Haltiwanger et al (2009) warn that it would be misleading to conclude that new
rms account for more than 100% percent of all net new jobs. Other, mature, rms
are creating jobs. However the net growth from new rms alone exceeds the average.
5Hall (2005) also reports a relatively acyclical job separation rate.
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convincingly report evidence suggesting that a variation in the number of
competitors a¤ects the degree of competition in the market and through
this way the mark up that rms can impose on marginal costs. BGM
(2007) and Etro and Colciago (2010) emphasize the procyclicality of real
prots.
Our work bridges two apparently uncorrelated recent lines of re-
search. The rst one is constituted by theoretical and empirical con-
tributions studying the role of rms entry and the creation of new
products for the business cycle. Recent empirical works on the man-
ufacturing sector by Broda and Weinstein (2009) and Bernard et al.
(2008) have emphasized the importance of the extensive margin in the
process of product creation or innovation. For this reason BGM (2007)
design the entry process as a process of creation of new products with
limited substitutability which may depend on the number of available
products. Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) in an RBC framework and Col-
ciago and Etro (2010) in a frictional, BGM-like set up consider Bertrand
and Cournot competition between and endogenous number of producers.
These contributions show that the extensive margin of product creation
improves the performance of an otherwise standard exible prices DSGE
model at matching impulse responses and business cycle moments for
U.S. data. Recently Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Lewis (2010) uncov-
ered a correlation between rmsdynamics and monetary policy, suggest-
ing that the extensive margin may constitute a further welfare dimension
for monetary policy intervention. The second line of research relevant
for our analysis is constituted by those contributions trying to solve the
unemployment-volatility puzzle presented by Shimer (2005) and Hall
(2005) mainly by modifying the basic Mortensen-Pissarides model. To
this group belongs the work by Hall (2005), who argues that the lack of
amplication characterizing the basic Mortensen-Pissarides model lies
in the wage Nash bargaining assumption. He suggests that real wage
rigidity could help solving the puzzle. In a similar vein Gertler and
Trigari (2009) extend the RBC labor search model of Andolfatto (1996)
and Merz (1995) by introducing staggered multi-period wage contracting
and show that their model exhibits a strong amplication. We collocate
in this group also the article by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) who
adopt the same Mortensen-Pissarides model used by Shimer (2005), but
show that the model features a stronger propagation mechanism once
parametrized using a di¤erent calibration strategy.
This paper argues that oligopolistic competition between an endoge-
nous number of producers is a relevant dimension to consider in order to
understand the connection between labor markets and the goods mar-
kets and to improve the ability of the Mortensen-Pissarides theoretical
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framework to t key labor market statistics. Also, to our knowledge, the
model we propose is the rst one to address in a unied framework the
three stylized facts listed at the beginning of this Introduction.
The papers closest related to ours are Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003),
and more recently Hebel and Haefke (2009), Shao and Silos (2008) and
Kaas and Kircher (2011). With respect to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
we provide a fully specied DSGE model where the dynamics of the
number of rms is explicitly modeled. Hebel and Haefke (2009) consider
a labor search model with rmsentry. In their model entry and exit
of rms are exogenous and the number of producers is determined en-
dogenously in the long run by means of a zero prots condition. Their
analysis focuses on the long run e¤ects of deregulation in the goods mar-
kets for the level of unemployment and the real wage. Shao and Silos
(2008) introduce rmsentry in a Mortensen-Pissarides-style model with
monopolistic competition in the goods market characterized by small
rms. They identify the countercyclical value of vacancies as the main
propagation channel of technology shocks and study the business cycle
implications of their model for the labor and prot shares of output.
Also, the small rms assumption does not allow to address the empirical
evidence on job creation by new entrants. Our analysis di¤ers from that
in Kaas and Kircher (2011) with respect to both assumptions and focus.
For what concerns assumptions we feature strategic interactions among
large rms which bargaining the wage on a period-by-period basis with
their employees. The aforementioned authors consider an alternative
framework to characterize rmsdynamics in a frictional labor market,
where large, risk-neutral rms can commit to long-term wage contracts.
With respect to the focus, we analyze endogenous market structures
both in the long and the short run, and we emphasize their role under
di¤erent forms of competition for the propagation of exogenous technol-
ogy shocks on labor market variables. Kaas and Kircher (2011) focus
instead on the e¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium in the presence
of multiple-workers rms that can commit to long-term wage contracts.
In this environment e¢ ciency obtains on all margins of job creation and
destruction, both with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Their model
is also consistent with several empirical regularities about rm size, job
ows and pay.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 de-
scribes the model and its dynamic properties in the short and long run.
Section 2 provides the conditions for e¢ ciency of the decentralized equi-
librium. Section 3 displays the analysis of the impulse response functions
and the second moments to exogenous technology shocks. Section 4 fo-
cus on the e¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
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Technical details are left in the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Labor and Goods Markets
There are two main building blocks in the model: oligopolistic competi-
tion with endogenous entry in the goods market and search and matching
frictions in the labor market. In this paragraph we outlay their main
features.
As in Colciago and Etro (2010 a and b), the economy features a
continuum of sectors, or industries, on the unit interval. Sectors are
indexed with k 2 (0; 1) : Each sector k is characterized by di¤erent rms
i = 1; 2; :::; Nkt producing the same good in di¤erent varieties. At the
beginning of each period N ekt new rms enter into sector k, while at the
end of the period a fraction  2 (0; 1) of market participants exits from
the market for exogenous reasons.6 Below we describe the entry process
and the mode of competition within in each sector in detail.
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions,
as in Andolfatto (1996) and Mertz (1995). A fraction ut of the unit
mass population is unemployed at time t and searches for a job. Firms
producing at time t need to post vacancies in order to hire new workers.
Unemployed workers and vacancies combine according to a CRS match-
ing function and deliver mt new hires, or matches, in each period. The
matching function reads as mt = m (v
tot
t )
1 
ut , where m reects the
e¢ ciency of the matching process, vtott is the total number of vacancies
created at time t and ut is the unemployment rate. The probability that
a rm lls a vacancy is given by qt = mtvtott , while the probability to nd
a job for an unemployed worker reads as zt = mtut . Firms and individu-
als take both probabilities as given. Matches become productive in the
same period in which they are formed. Each rm separates exogenously
from a fraction 1   % of existing workers each period, where % is the
probability that a worker stays with a rm until the next period.
As a result a worker may separate from a job for two reasons: ei-
ther because the rm where the job is located exits from the market or
because the match is destroyed. Since these sources of separation are
independent, the evolution of aggregate employment, Lt, is given by
Lt = (1  ) %Lt 1 +mt (1)
where the number of unemployed workers searching for a job at time t
6As discussed in BGM (2007), if macroeconomic shocks are small enough Nekt is
positive in every period. New entrants nance entry on the stock market.
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is ut = 1  Lt 1.7
2.2 Households and Firms
Using the family construct of Mertz (1995) we can refer to a represen-
tative household consisting of a continuum of individuals of mass one.
Members of the household insure each other against the risk of being
unemployed. The representative family has lifetime utility:
U = E0
1X
t=0
t
(Z 1
0
lnCktdk   Lt h
1+1='
t
1 + 1='
)
; '  0 (2)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and the variable ht represents
individual hours worked. Note that Ckt is a consumption index for a set
of goods produced in sectors k 2 [0; 1], dened as
Ckt =
"
NktX
i=1
Ckt(i)
" 1
"
# "
" 1
(3)
where Ckt(i) is the production of rm i of this sector, and " > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in each sector. The
distinction between di¤erent sectors and di¤erent goods within a sector
allows to realistically separate limited substitutability at the aggregated
level, and high substitutability at the disaggregated level. Contrary
to many macroeconomic models with imperfect competition, our focus
will be on the market structure of disaggregated sectors: intrasectoral
substitutability (between goods produced by rms of a same sector) is
high, while intersectoral substitutability is low.8 The family receives
real labor income wthtLt and prots from the ownership of rms. Fur-
ther, we assume that unemployed individuals receive an unemployment
benet b in real terms, leading to an overall benet for the household
equal to b (1  Lt). This is nanced through lump sum taxation by the
government. Notice that the household recognizes that employment is
7Given that population is normalized to one, the number of unemployed workers
and the unemployment rate are identical.
8Our functional form implies unitary elasticity of substitution between goods pro-
duced in di¤erent sectors. In this case the aggregate consumption bundle enjoyed
by the household could be dened as CAt = exp
R 1
0
lnCktdk

and associated to
the aggregate price index PAt = exp
R 1
0
lnPktdk

. The same approach has been
proposed by Colciago and Etro (2010 a). Atkeson and Burnstein (2008) consider a
trade model with multiple sectors. Even if they allow for general substitutability
across sectors, their numerical results are obtained assuming a unitary intersectoral
elasticity of substitution.
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determined by the ows of its members into and out of employment
according to
Lt = (1  ) %Lt 1 + ztut (4)
Households choose how much to save in riskless bonds and in the creation
of new rms through the stock market according to standard Euler and
asset pricing equations.9
The intratemporal optimality conditions for the optimal choices of
Ckt requires:
PktCkt = EXPt for any k (5)
where EXPt is total nominal expenditure allocated to the goods pro-
duced in each sector in period t and Pkt is the price index for consumption
in sector k: due to the unitary elasticity of substitution, total expendi-
ture is identical across sectors.
The marginal value to the household of having one member employed
rather than unemployed,  t, which is a determinant of the wage bargain-
ing problem is
 t =
1
Ct
(wtht   b)   h
1+1='
t
1 + 1='
+ Et [(1  )   zt+1]  t+1 (6)
Each rm i in sector k produces a good with a linear production function.
We abstract from capital accumulation issues and assume that labor is
the only input. Output of rm i in sector k is then:
ykt(i) = Atnkt (i)hkt(i) (7)
where At is the, common to all sectors, total factor productivity at time
t, nkt (i) is rm is time t workforce and hkt(i) represent hours per em-
ployee. Since each sector can be characterized in the same way, in what
follows we will drop the index k and refer to the representative sector.10
2.3 Endogenous Market Structures
Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and BGM (2007) we assume that
new entrants at time t will only start producing at time t + 1. Given
the exogenous exit probability , the average number of rms per sector,
Nt, follows the equation of motion:
Nt+1 = (1  )(Nt +N et ) (8)
9We report these conditions in Appendix A.
10We provide analytical details in Appendix A.
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where N et is the average number of new entrants at time t. We assume
that entry requires a xed cost  , which is measured in units of output.
In each period, the same nominal expenditure for each sector EXPt
is allocated across the available goods according to the direct demand
function:
yt(i) = Yt

pt(i)
Pt
 "
=
pt(i)
 "
P 1 "t
YtPt =
pt(i)
 "EXPt
P 1 "t
i = 1; 2; :::; Nt
(9)
where Pt is the price index
Pt =
"
NtX
j=1
pt(j)
 (" 1)
#  1
" 1
(10)
such that total expenditure satises EXPt =
NtX
j=1
pt(j)Ct(j) = CtPt.11
Inverting the direct demand functions, we can derive the system of in-
verse demand functions:
pt(i) =
yt(i)
  1
"EXPt
NtX
j=1
yt(j)
" 1
"
i = 1; 2; :::; Nt (11)
Period t real prots of an incumbent producer are dened as
t (i) = t (i) yt (i)  wt (i)nt (i)ht (i)  vt (i) (12)
where t (i) (=
pt(i)
Pt
) is the real price of rm is output, vt (i) represents
the number of vacancies posted at time t and  is the output cost of
keeping a vacancy open. The value of a rm is the expected discounted
value of its future prots
Vt (i) = Et
1X
s=t+1
t;ss (i) (13)
where t;t+1 = (1  ) 

Ct+1
Ct
 1
is the householdsstochastic discount
factor which takes into account that rmssurvival probability is 1  
. Incumbent rms which do not exit from the market have a time t
individual workforce given by
nt (i) = %nt 1 (i) + vt (i) qt (14)
11The demand of the individual good and the price index are the solution to the,
usual, consumption expenditure minimization problem.
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2.3.1 Bertrand Competition
Let us consider competition in prices. Contrary to the traditional Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) approach which neglects strategic interactions between
rms, we take these into consideration and derive the exact Bertrand
equilibrium. Each rm i chooses pt(i); nt (i) and vt (i) to maximize
t (i) +Vt (i), taking as given the price of the other rms. Maximization
is subject to three constraints, namely (7), (9) and (14).
The variable t (i) is the Lagrange multiplier of the latter constraint,
and represents the time-t value of an additional workers to the rm;
mct (i) is the time t real marginal cost faced by rm i and represents
the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (7).
In what follows we distinguish between incumbent rms according
to their period of entry. We dene as rst period incumbent rms those
producers which entered the market in period t-1 and at time t produce
for the rst time. The term mature incumbent rms refers, instead, to
producers which entered the market in period t-2 or prior. The distinc-
tion is relevant because rst period incumbents have no beginning of
period workforce. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 and 2 show that in both
the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria incumbent producers, no matter
the period of entry, have the same size, impose the same mark up over
marginal costs and have the same individual level of production.
Proposition 1 (Bertrand Equilibrium) In the Bertrand equilibrium,
no matter the period of entry: i) the marginal cost and the value of
an additional worker are identical across producers: mct (i) = mct and
t (i) = t; ii) rms set the same mark up over the nominal marginal
cost, given by
Pt (";Nt) =
" (Nt   1) + 1
("  1) (Nt   1) (15)
iii) rms have the same level of production, the same size and demand
the same number of hours per employee: yt (i) = yt, nt (i) = nt and
ht (i) = ht.
Proof. See Appendix B1
Since in equilibrium rms set the same prices, it follows from (10)
that the relative price is also identical across producers and reads as
t (";Nt) =
pt
Pt
= N
1
" 1
t . The mark up 
P
t (";Nt) is decreasing in the
degree of substitutability between products ", with an elasticity P" =
"Nt
(1 "+"Nt)(" 1) . Moreover, the mark up vanishes in case of perfect sub-
stitutability: lim"!1 P (";Nt) = 1. Finally, the mark up is decreasing
in the number of rms, with an elasticity PN =
Nt
(1+"(Nt 1))(Nt 1) . Notice
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that the elasticity of the mark up to entry under competition in prices is
decreasing in the level of substitutability between goods, and it tends to
zero when the goods are approximately homogenous. When Nt !1 the
mark up tends to "=(" 1), the traditional one under monopolistic com-
petition. As well known, strategic interactions between a nite number
of rms lead to a higher mark up than under monopolistic competition.
2.3.2 Cournot Competition
In this section we consider competition in quantities, which has been
largely neglected in general equilibrium macroeconomic models with im-
perfect competition. In this case rms maximize t + Vt choosing their
production yt(i) beside nt (i) and vt (i) ; taking as given the production
of the other rms. Maximization is subject to the same constraints as
above, taking care to replace the direct demand function (9) with the
inverse demand function given by equation (11). Most of the considera-
tions drawn in the Bertrand competition case extend to Cournot compe-
tition. Proposition 2 fully characterizes the equilibrium under Cournot
competition.
Proposition 2 (Cournot Equilibrium) Points i),iii) and iii) of Propo-
sition 1 extend to the Cournot case. The symmetric Cournot equilibrium
generates the individual output
yt =
"  1
"
Nt   1
N2t
EXPt
MCt
(16)
where MCt is the nominal marginal cost, the associated equilibrium mark
up is:
Q(";Nt) =
"Nt
("  1) (Nt   1) (17)
Proof. See Appendix B2.
For a given number of rms, the mark up under competition in quan-
tities is always larger than the one obtained under competition in prices,
as well known for models of product di¤erentiation (see for instance
Vives, 1999). Notice that the mark up is decreasing in the degree of
substitutability between products ", with an elasticity Q" = 1=("   1),
which is always smaller than P" : higher substitutability reduces mark
ups faster under competition in prices. In the Cournot equilibrium, the
mark up remains positive for any degree of substitutability, since even in
the case of homogenous goods, we have lim"!1 Q(";Nt) = Nt=(Nt 1).
This allow us to consider the e¤ect of strategic interactions in an other-
wise standard setup with perfect substitute goods within sectors (as in
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the standard RBC setting with search and matching frictions of Andol-
fatto (1996) and Mertz (1995)).
In the general formulation the mark up is decreasing and convex in
the number of rms with elasticity QN = 1=(N 1), which is decreasing in
the number of rms (the mark up decreases with entry at an increasing
rate) and independent from the degree of substitutability between goods.
Since QN > 
P
N for any number of rms or degree of substitutability, we
can conclude that entry decreases mark ups faster under competition in
quantities compared to competition in prices, a result that will have an
impact on the relative behavior of the economy under the two forms of
competition. Only when Nt !1 the mark up tends to "=(" 1), which
is the traditional mark up under monopolistic competition.12
2.3.3 Job Creation and Vacancy Posting
Combining the rst conditions for prots maximization (see Appendix
B) we get the Job Creation Condition (JCC), which, under both forms
of competition, reads as

qt
=

t
t
At   wt

ht + %Ett;t+1

qt+1
(18)
The JCC equates the real marginal cost of hiring a worker, the left
hand side, with the marginal benet, the right hand side. Note that we
assumed that rms take individual wages as given when choosing em-
ployment.13 Importantly, the marginal benet depends positively on the
ratio t
t
, which is a positive function of the number of rms in the mar-
ket, Nt.14 As the number of market competitors increases, the relative
price of existing varieties rises. At the same time, stronger competition
leads to a lower mark up and thus to a higher demand by consumers.
Both e¤ects provide rms with an incentive to create vacancies which
is absent in a model with exogenous market structures. Moreover, the
incentive changes with the extent of competition and, since net entry is
procyclical as we show below, it is procyclical.
Let FPt and v
FP
t be, respectively, the real prots and the number
of vacancies posted by a rst period incumbent. Symmetrically, t and
vt dene, respectively, the individual prots and vacancies posted by
mature incumbent rms.
12In what follows, to lighten the notation, we suppress the dependance of t and
t from " and Nt.
13A similar assumption can be found, inter alia, in chapter 3 of Pissarides (2000)
and Krause and Lubik (2007). This assumption rules out the the hiring externality
emphasized by Ebell and Haefke (2009) . However, the same authors show that the
over-hiring e¤ect on unemployment and wages is quantitatively very small.
14Of course, t di¤ers according to the mode of competition.
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Proposition 3 (Prots and hiring policy) Under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition it follows that: i) vFPt =
nt
qt
= vt   %nt 1qt and ii)
FPt = t   %nt 1qt .
Proof. See Appendix B3.
Since all incumbent rms are characterized by the same size, the op-
timal hiring policy of rst period incumbent rms, which have no initial
workforce, consists in posting at time t as many vacancies as required to
reach the size of a mature incumbent producer. Given vacancy posting
is costly, they will su¤er lower prots.
As a consequence of their hiring policy, rst period incumbent pro-
ducers will grow faster than mature incumbent producers. This is con-
sistent with the U.S. empirical evidence in Haltiwanger et al. (2009),
which suggests that a start-up creates on average more new jobs than
an incumbent rm.
2.3.4 Endogenous Entry
In each period the level of entry is determined endogenously to equate
the value of a new entrant, V et , to the entry cost
V et =  (19)
The next Proposition provides a useful relationship between the value
of a new entrant and the value of an incumbent rm, denoted by Vt.
Proposition 4 (Value of an Incumbent Firm) The value of an in-
cumbent rm is larger than that of a new entrant
Vt = V
e
t + %Ett;t+1
nt
qt+1
(20)
Proof. See Appendix B4.
Perspective new entrants have lower value than incumbent rms be-
cause they will have, in case they do not exit from the market before
starting production, to set up a workforce in their rst period of activity.
The di¤erence in the value between an incumbent producer and a new
entrant is, in fact, the discounted value of the higher vacancy posting
cost that the latter will su¤er, with respect to the former, in the rst
period of activity.
2.4 Bargaining over Wages and Hours
We assume Nash wage bargaining, so that the rm and each worker split
the joint surplus of their employment relationship. Thus, the real wage
is set to maximize the product
(t)
1  ( tCt)
 (21)
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Recall that the term in the rst bracket is the value to the rm of
having an additional worker, the second term is the households surplus
expressed in units of consumption. The parameter  reects the parties
relative bargaining power. The FOC for Nash bargaining is
t = (1  )  tCt (22)
Using the denitions of t and  t gives, after some manipulations, the
wage equation
wt = (1  ) b+ mctAt + (1  )Ct h
1='
t
1 + 1='
+

ht
Et
zt+1
qt+1
Ct
Ct+1
(23)
Since zt
qt
= t, t;t+1 = (1  ) 

Ct+1
Ct
 1
and, importantly, mct =
t
t
we
obtain
wt = (1  ) b+  t
t
At + (1  )Ct h
1='
t
1 + 1='
+

(1  )
1
ht
Ett;t+1t+1
(24)
Clearly the mark up function, t, di¤ers according to the form of compe-
tition, whether Bertrand or Cournot. In both cases, however, the direct
e¤ect of entry on the real wage is captured through the term  t
t
At.
Notice that t
t
At represents the marginal revenue product (MRP) of la-
bor, while  represents the share of the MRP which goes to workers. As
described above, entry leads to an increase in the MRP of labor. Thus,
ceteris paribus, stronger competition shifts the wage curve up. This
result is similar to that in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), who nd a
positive e¤ect of competition on the real wage.
Hours are set to maximize the joint surplus of the match, given by
St = t +  tCt: The FOC with respect of ht is
Cth
1='
t =
t
t
At (25)
where, as above, t depends on the form of competition. Hours worked
are such that the the marginal rate of substitution between hours and
consumption equals the MRP of labor. Stronger competition leads to an
increase in hours bargained between the workers and rms for the same
reasons for which competition positively a¤ects the wage schedule.
2.5 Aggregation and Market Clearing
Considering that the individual workforce, nt, is identical across produc-
ers leads to
Lt = ntNt (26)
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To obtain aggregate output notice that PtYt =
NtX
i=1
ptyt = Ntptyt,
further given t =
pt
Pt
and the individual production function it follows
that
Yt = tNtyt = tAtLtht (27)
Aggregating the budget constraints of households we obtain the ag-
gregate resource constraint of the economy
Ct +  N
e
t = WthtLt + t (28)
which states that the sum of consumption and investment in new en-
trants must equal the sum between labor income and aggregate prots,
t, distributed to households at time t. Aggregate prots are dened as
t = (1  )Nt 1t + [Nt   (1  )Nt 1] NPt (29)
where (1  )Nt 1 is the number of mature incumbent producers, and
Nt   (1  )N et 1 is the number of time-t rst period incumbent rms.
Goodsmarket clearing requires
Yt = Ct +N
E
t  + v
tot
t (30)
Finally, the dynamics of aggregate employment reads as
Lt = (1  ) %Lt 1 + qtvtott (31)
which shows that workers employed to a rm which exits the market join
the mass of unemployed. Appendix C lists the full set of equilibrium
conditions for the economy.
2.6 Steady State and Calibration
In order to obtain values for the steady state levels of variables and for
the deep structural parameters, we need to impose 14 restrictions. Cal-
ibration is conducted on a quarterly basis. The discount factor, , is
set to the standard value of 0.99 for quarterly data, while the rate of
business destruction, , equals 0.025 to match the U.S. empirical level of
10 percent business destruction a year reported by BGM (2007). With
no loss of generality, the value of  is such that steady state labor supply
equals one. The Frish elasticity of labor supply reduces to ', to which
we assign a value of one as in Monacelli et al. (2010). We choose " = 6
as the baseline value for inter-sectoral elasticity of substitution between
goods. Notice, however, that our model allows for a large variety of com-
binations of substitutability between goods (") and mark up (), which
16
in turn depends on the mode of competition. Steady state TFP equals
A = 1. The baseline value for the entry cost is  = 1. Alternative combi-
nations of A and  a¤ect the endogenous level of market power because
a low entry cost compared to the size of the market leads to a larger
number of competitors and thus to lower mark ups, and viceversa. How-
ever, the impulse response functions below are not qualitatively a¤ected
by values of  within a reasonable range. The baseline parameterization
leads to a price mark up of 23 percent under Bertrand Competition and
of 33 percent under Cournot competition, which are broadly in line with
the evidence in Scarpetta et al. (1996).15
Next we turn to parameters that are specic to the search and match-
ing framework. We adopt a conventional parameterization. The aggre-
gate separation rate is 1   (1  ) %. We set % such that the the latter
equals 0:1, as suggested by estimates provided by Hall (1995) and Davis
(1996). The elasticity of matches to unemployment is  = 1
2
, which
is within the range of the plausible values of 0.5 to 0.7 reported by
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) in their survey of the literature on the
estimation of the matching function. We impose symmetry in bargaining
and set  = 1
2
, as in the bulk of the literature. Importantly, as we show
below, the equality between the elasticity of matches to unemployment
and the workerspower in wage setting does not guarantee e¢ ciency. We
normalize the value of  = 1.16 Following Dee Haan et al. (2000) and
Shimer (2005) we x the probability that a vacancy is lled to q = 0:7.
Finally, we set the unemployment benet b such that the replacement
ratio b
w
= 0:42, as in Shimer (2005) and Gertler and Trigari (2009).
Given these parameters we can recover the cost of posting a vacancy 
by equating the steady state version of the JCC and the steady state
wage setting equation.
The steady state rate of unemployment is equal to
u =
1  (1  ) %
q + (1  (1  ) %) = 0:125
which is increasing in the rate, , of business destruction and in the
exogenous, rm-level job separation rate, %. As expected the unem-
ployment rate is decreasing in the job lling probability q. While the
15Pissarides (2003) provides an index for entry delay as the average number of
business days necessary to set up a new rm. Ebell and Haefke (2009) convert this
index in months of lost output to get a value of the entry cost  : They nd that
entry costs amount to 15 percent of quarterly output in the U.S. Under the baseline
parameterization, steady state aggregate entry costs (N
e 
Y ) amount to 14 percent of
output under Bertrand competition and to 18 percent under Cournot competition.
16The value of  does not a¤ects the dynamic of the model. See the discussion in
Shimer (2005) and more recently in Monacelli et al. (2010).
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Figure 1: Steady state value of some selected variables as a function of
the entry cost  .
endogenous steady state rate of unemployment is larger that the average
quarterly rate for the U.S., it is in line with the value used by Krause
and Lubik (2007) and much lower that those in Andolfatto (1996) and
Trigari (2009).17
Figure 1 shows the steady state values of some key variables as a
function of the entry cost under both Cournot and Bertrand Compe-
tition. As well known, when rms compete in prices the equilibrium
mark ups are lower, which in turn allows for a lower number of rms
to be active in the market. As a consequence, given the entry costs,
the Bertrand equilibrium is characterized by a lower number of goods
compared to the Cournot equilibrium. Not surprisingly a lower entry
cost is, in both frameworks, associated to a higher number of producers
and thus to stronger competition and to a lower mark up. As mentioned
earlier, the real wage is higher in more competitive environments.
Notice that the steady state ratio between jobs created by rst period
incumbent rms (JCFP ) and total job creation (JC) is given by
JCFP
JC
=
(1  )N evNP q
vtotq
=

q
(1  u)
u
= 0:25
which implies that job creation by new producers account for about 25
per cent of total (gross) job creation, close to the quarterly U.S. average
17The computation of the steady state is in Appendix D.
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of 20 per cent reported by Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008). Also notice
that the ratio between workers employed by rst period incumbent rms
(LFP ) and total employment (L) is
LFP
L
=
(1  )N e L
N
L
=  = 0:025
New producers account for about 2.5 percent of total employment, slightly
lower than the 3 percent reported by Haltiwanger et al. (2009) as the
average value for the U.S. between 1976 and 2005. Notice that the shares
considered are independent of both the entry cost and the competitive
framework.
3 Business Cycle Analysis
In what follows we will rst study the impulse response functions to
a technology shock, and nally we will evaluate the second order mo-
ments. To assess the role of endogenous market structures, we compare
the performance of the Bertrand and Cournot model to that of a stan-
dard search model, characterized by monopolistic competition in the
goods market and capital accumulation. Monopolistic competition im-
plies that the market structure, i.e. number of producers and mark ups,
is exogenous. Specically, rms do not interact strategically and set a
constant mark up  = "
" 1 over marginal costs.
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The benchmark search model features a Cobb-Douglas production
function of the form yt = Atkat 1 (Ltht)
1  and a dynamics of physical
capital given by kt = (1  ) kt 1 + Ikt ; where Ikt represents investment.
As in the bulk of the literature we set  = 0:025 and  = 1
3
.19 The cali-
bration strategy of remaining parameters is identical across the models.
3.1 IRFs to a technology Shock
In this section we show the qualitative reactions of the economy to a
persistent technology shock. Technology is assumed to follow a rst
order autoregressive process given by A^t = AA^t 1 + "At, where A^t =
ln (At=A) and A 2 (0; 1) and "At is a white noise disturbance, with zero
expected value and standard deviation A.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict percentage deviations from the steady
state of key variables in response to a one percent technology shock with
persistency A = 0:9; time on the horizontal axis is in quarters. We
18We say that the markup is exogenous in the case of monopolistic competition
because its value is fully determined once the elasitcity of substitution between goods
is xed. In other words the two magnitudes cannot be set independently.
19We compare our baseline model to the search model with capital so that both
are characterized by endogenous investment.
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consider alternative market structures. Solid lines refer to the case with
competition in prices, dashed line to that with competition in quantities
and, nally, dotted line refer to the benchmark search model.
Under Bertrand and Cournot competition the market structure is
generated endogenously and the steady state mark ups are respectively
23 per cent and 33 per cent. On the contrary in the case of monopolistic
competition the mark up is exogenous and equals 20 per cent. Figures
2 and 3 show that the quantitative reactions of the main aggregate vari-
ables to the shock are very similar in both the Bertrand and the Cournot
frameworks.
The temporary shock increases output and creates large prot op-
portunities. This, in turn, leads to entry of new rms and lowers the
mark up. Recall that entry is subject to a one period time-to-build lag,
which implies that the number of producing rms, Nt, does not change
on impact. Given that both the love for variety and the mark up are
just functions of Nt they are also initially muted. Output, instead, has
its peak in the initial period due to the strong response of investment
(in new rms) and consumption. To satisfy the higher demand, existing
rms use both the intensive margin and the extensive margin of labor.
The need to hire workers boosts vacancy posting on impact. In the pe-
riods after the shock vacancy creation is more sustained, with respect to
the benchmark model, for two reasons. The rst one in due to vacancy
creation by new entrants which need to build up their workforce. The
second one is due to the rise in the number of producers that leads to an
increase in the ratio t
t
, which provides an incentive for vacancy posting
to both existing rms and to new entrants. Figure 3 shows that under
endogenous market structures the response of the job nding rate and
the vacancy lling rate are strongly amplied with respect to those ob-
tained in the benchmark search model. The large number of vacancies
posted on impact by incumbent rms, and vacancy posting by entrants
in the periods after the shocks, makes it harder to ll a vacancy for a
producers. The counterpart of a markedly countercyclical vacancy lling
rate is a strongly procyclical job nding rate. Hall (2005) argues that
the job nding rate is the key variable in understanding the large uctu-
ation in unemployment over the past 50 years. The strongly procyclical
response of the job nding rate delivered by the Bertrand and Cournot
models is at the basis of the large swing in unemployment. The endo-
geneity of the market structures implies a response of the unemployment
rate in the period after the shock which is almost three times larger, and
more persistent, than that observed in the benchmark search model.
While the shock vanishes and entry strengthens competition, output
and prots of the rms drop and the incentives to enter disappear. At
20
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Figure 2: Impulse response function to a temporary technology shock.
some point net exit from the market occurs and the rate of unemploy-
ment, the mark up and thus the incentive to create vacancy gradually
return to the steady state.
Importantly, notice that our framework delivers procyclical prots to-
gether with countercyclical mark ups. Further notice that output jumps
on impact in response to a TFP shock, while the mark up does not
change on impact and falls more in future periods. This correlation pat-
tern is consistent with the analysis in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
and with the VAR evidence for the U.S. in Colciago and Etro (2010 a).
To sum up, the impact of a temporary shock on the main macro-
economic variables is magnied in the presence of endogenous market
structures. The model displays a much a stronger, with respect to the
case of exogenous market structures, response of unemployment, vacancy
creation and job market tightness.
3.2 Second Moments
To further assess the implications of endogenous market structures for
the business cycle, we compute second moments of the key macroeco-
nomic variables. In this exercise we follow the RBC literature and assume
that the only source of random uctuations are temporary exogenous
technology shocks. We calibrate the productivity process as in King
and Rebelo (2000), with persistence A = 0:979 and standard deviation
A = 0:0072. We use the same process as in King and Rebelo (2000)
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Figure 3: Impulse response function to a temporary technology shock.
for comparison purposes with the bulk of the literature and to verify the
additional impact of our propagation channel for a given shock.
We report in Table 1 the statistics on US data (1951:1 / 2009:3) for
output Y , consumption C, investment I, aggregate hours, L;, aggregate
prots , the unemployment rate u, the mark up , the job nding
rate z and vacancies v.20 In the same table we report the moments pro-
duces by the benchmark search model. As it is well known, the basic
search model fails at replicating the high variability of unemployment,
vacancies, aggregate hours and the job nding rate. Also, given the mo-
nopolistic competitive nature of the market structure, it cannot deliver
mark up countercyclicality coupled with prot procyclicality.
Table 2 reports second moments of Y , C, u, I  N eV e, L, , ; z and
vtot for our model with competition in quantities and with competition
in prices under the baseline parameterization.
20Variables have been logged. We report moments of HP ltered variables with
a smoothing parameter equal to 1600. Most of the data derive from FRED, the
Federeal Reserve Economic Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Vacancies are proxied by the Help-Wanted Advertising Index computed by the Con-
ference Board. Monthly job nding probability is constructed in the way suggested
by Shimer (2005). For monthly data series, the average of the monthly data in each
quarter is used. Prots include both the remuneration of capital and the extra-
prots due to market power. The mark-up is computed using a labor-share based
measure along the lines suggested by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and described
in Colciago and Etro (2010 a).
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V ariable  (X)  (X) = (Y ) E (Xt; Xt 1) Corr (Xt; Yt)
Y 1:58; 1:03 1 0:84; 0:72 1
C 1:22; 0:89 0:77; 0:86 0:82; 0:73 0:86; 0:99
I 5:12; 1:54 3: 24; 1: 49 0:90; 0:75 0:86; 0:99
u 13:09; 1:06 8: 28; 1: 03 0:88; 0:79  0:65; 0:71
L 1:92; 0:15 1: 21; 0:14 0:88; 0:76 0:82; 0:99
z 8:38; 1:29 5: 3; 1: 25 0:80; 0:71 0:82; 0:99
v 14:10; 1:98 8: 92; 1: 92 0:91; 0:43 0:75; 0:92
v
u
26:35; 2:57 16: 68; 1: 53 0:90; 0:71 0:79; 0:99
 8:59; 2:56 5: 43; 2: 48 0:80; 0:73 0:68; 0:99
 0:96; 0:00 0:61; 0:00 0:77; 0:00  0:28; 0:00
Table 1: Second moments. LEFT: U.S. data. RIGHT: benchmark search
model
Both models deliver a very similar performance at replicating the
U.S. business cycle. The volatility of output under endogenous market
structures is almost as large as that of US data. The endogeneity of
market structures implies a substantially higher volatility of aggregate
hours with respect to the benchmark model. This is due to both a higher
volatility of the intensive and extensive margin of labor.21 Unemploy-
ment is far from being as volatile as in the data. However, while it is as
volatile as output in the benchmark model, it is twice as volatile as out-
put in our framework. Similar considerations extend to vacancies, which
are 3.3 times as volatile as output, the job nding probability, which has
a volatility more than double with respect to output. Both frameworks
deliver an extremely volatile job market tightness with respect to the
basic search model. Similarly, the volatility of investment is about three
times higher in our framework, essentially matching that in the data.
The volatilities of prots and the mark up are severely underestimated,
however the model does a relatively good job at matching the negative
contemporaneous correlation between output and the mark up.
Considering that we adopt a very standard and conservative model
calibration we see the performance of both the Bertrand and the Cournot
frameworks as a success for three main reasons. First, without resorting
to nominal rigidities in wages (real or nominal) or prices, it substantially
outperforms a standard model of search in the labor market in terms of
variability of labor market variables. Second, the model can reproduce
the procyclicality of entry and the countercyclicality of the mark up ob-
served in the data. Third, it matches the nonlinear time prole of the
21The standard deviation of individual hours is 0.17 under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition, while it is 0.02 under the standard search model.
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correlation between the mark up and the cycle documented by Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1999) and emphasized by BGM (2007). For these
reasons we claim that endogenous market structures are a relevant am-
plication channel of technology shocks in an otherwise standard model
of search in the labor market.
V ariable  (X)  (X) = (Y ) E (Xt; Xt 1) Corr (Xt; Yt)
Y 1:46; 1:47 1 0:74; 0:74 1
C 0:83; 0:83 0:56; 0:56 0:77; 0:77 0:98; 0:97
I 5:48; 4:41 3:75; 3:0 0:74; 0:74 0:98; 0:98
u 2:71; 2:72 1: 85; 1: 85 0:80; 0:80  0:71; 0:70
L 0:51; 0:52 0:35; 0:35 0:76; 0:76 0:99; 0:99
z 3:26; 3:27 2:23; 2: 22 0:73; 0:73 0:99; 0:98
v 4:94; 4:95 3:38; 3: 37 0:45; 0:45 0:93; 0:93
v
u
6:52; 6:56 4:46; 4: 46 0:73; 0:74 0:99; 0:98
 1:43; 1:44 0:98; 0:98 0:76; 0:75 0:99; 0:99
 0:02; 0:04 0:01; 0:027 0:96; 0:96  0:14; 0:13
Table 2: Second moments. Left: Bertrand Competition. Right :
Cournot Competition
4 Social E¢ ciency
Before concluding, we study a scenario where a benevolent social planner
(SP) maximizes householdslifetime utility by choosing quantity directly.
In doing this, the SP is subject to the same technological constraints
and the matching frictions described in the previous sections. Since the
economy resource constraint implies Ct = t (Nt)AtLtht  NEt    kvtott ,
the SP problem can be written as:
max
fCt;Nt+1;vtott ;Lt;ht;Net g1t=0
Et
 
ln
 
tAtLtht  NEt    kvtott

+
 Lt h
1+1='
t
1+1='
!
subject to (8) and (31) or, substituting the second constraint into the
objective function and considering that qt = mtvtott =
mu

t (vtott )
1 
vtott
max
fNt+1;Lt;vtott ;htg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
ln
 
tAtLtht  
 
1
1 Nt+1  Nt

   kvtott

+
 Lt h
1+1='
t
1+1='
#
such that Lt = (1  ) %Lt 1 + m (1  Lt 1) (vtott )1 . The social plan-
ner takes into account the e¤ect of the number of varieties, Nt, on the
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relative price t and the e¤ect of vacancy posting on the probability of
lling a vacancy qt. Let t be the Lagrange multiplier of the unique
constraint. FOCs with respect to Nt+1; Lt; vtott ; ht are, respectively:
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 = (1  ) Et Ct
Ct+1

N;t+1At+1Lt+1ht+1 +  

(32)
 (Nt)Atht
Ct
  h
1+ 1
'
t
1 + 1
'
= t   Ett+1
"
(1  ) %  m

vtott+1
ut+1
1 #
(33)

Ct
= t (1  ) m

vtott
ut
 
(34)
Cth
1
'
t = tAt (35)
Substituting condition (34) into equation (33) yields

qt
= (1  )
24tAt   Ct h
1
'
t
1 + 1
'
35ht   
(1  )Ett;t+1t+1 + %Et
t;t+1
qt+1
(36)
Denition (Planning Equilibrium) A planning equilibrium consists
of an allocation fLt; ht; Nt+1; vtott g1t=0 satisfying equations (32),
(33) ; (36) and (35) for given N0, L0 and fAtg1t=0.
Next we evaluate the e¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium (CE).
In particular we are interested to assess whether the Hosios (1990) con-
dition, that is  = , is su¢ cient to achieve social e¢ ciency. For conve-
nience, in this section we assume that b = 0. We rst reduce the Euler
equations for the assets of new entrants and incumbent rms to a single
equation. The latter reads as
St = (1  ) Et Ct
Ct+1

1  wt+1
At+1

Yt+1   kvtott+1 + St+1

(37)
where St = (1  ) (NtVt +N et  ) is the aggregate market value of
rms in the economy. Also, we combine the JCC and the wage schedule
to obtain the equivalent of equation (36) in decentralized economy, which
is

qt
= (1  )
"
t
t
At   Ct h
1='
t
1 + 1='
#
ht  
(1  )Ett;t+1t+1+%Et
t;t+1
qt+1
(38)
22We denote with N;t the derivative of the relative price t with respect to the
number of varieties, Nt.
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Figure 4: Panels a)-e): gap between the CE allocation and the SP
allocation as a function of the entry cost. Panel f): welfare cost due to
an ine¢ cient allocation.
Finally recall that the condition for optimal labor supply in the CE reads
as
Cth
1='
t =
t
t
At (39)
In the remainder we compare the conditions for social e¢ ciency with
their counterparts in the CE and highlight a number of distortions.
Equation (38) reduces to its SP counterpart, that is equation (36),
under two alternative scenarios. In the rst one,  =  = 1, the Hosios
condition holds, workers have all the bargaining power but, as pointed
out by Ebell and Haefke (2009), the matching function is degenerate. In
the second one  =  < 1 and t =  = 1. Oligopolistic competition
a¤ects the value of the job market tightness even if the usual Hosios con-
dition is satised. Ruling out the distortion on the extensive margin of
labor due to imperfect competition in the goods market requires setting
t =  = 1. However, this would lead to no entry since, as pointed out
by BGM (2006), in the absence of a positive net mark up rms could
not recover the entry cost.
The positive mark up also implies a time-varying wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and the marginal rate
of transformation, which leads to an ine¢ ciently low supply of individual
hours. Thus, the price mark up creates an intratemporal distortion in
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both the extensive and the intensive margin of labor. Next, consider
equation (37) and compare it the SP correspondent condition (32). In
the CE new entrants and incumbent rms are characterized by di¤erent
values due to the di¤erent initial hiring policy. This heterogeneity creates
an intertemporal wedge between the CE and the SP equilibrium which
distorts the allocation of consumption across di¤erent dates.
As a consequence, both uctuations and the stationary equilibrium
are ine¢ cient in the CE. In particular the extensive margin of labor is
distorted even if the Hosios condition is satised. Inducing e¢ ciency
in the decentralized equilibrium would require a combination of scal
instruments aimed at undoing the intratemporal and the intertemporal
wedges described above.23
In what follows we compare the steady state allocations of the CE to
the SP one. We assume that the Hosios condition holds throughout the
analysis. In this case we can evaluate both the magnitude and the sign of
the distortion due to oligopolistic competition. Panels a)-e) of Figure 4
display the gap between the CE allocation and the SP allocation of some
selected variables as a function of the entry cost, under both Bertrand
and Cournot competition. The percentage di¤erence is measured in
terms of the SP allocation. Panel f) displays the welfare cost due to an
ine¢ cient allocation as the percentage variation in consumption that a
consumer should experience in the CE to be as well o¤ as under the SP
equilibrium.24
Few remarks are in order. In the case of a relatively high entry
cost, the CE could be characterized by an excessive number of varieties.
Under Cournot this happens quite quickly since the latter competitive
framework is characterized by a higher number of varieties with respect
to Bertrand. Recall that the number of varieties in the CE, or equiv-
alently the number of rms, is decreasing in the entry cost. However,
the opposite holds for the price-mark up. A high mark up could, in
turn, lead to high prots and thus to an excessive number of variety
produced. Due to imperfect competition the CE is characterized by
under-employment and by an ine¢ ciently low level of hours worked no
matter the hosios condition. The same can be said for output. As
23To achive rst best any scal instrument needs to be nanced through lump sum
taxation.
24We report on the vertical axes of panel a)-e) the value x = (XCE XSP )=XSP
100. The vertical axe of panel f) reports the value c  100, where c is such that
logCCE (1 + c)  LCE
 
hCE
1+ 1
1 + 1
= logCSP   LSP
 
hSP
1+ 1
1 + 1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the entry cost increases Bertrand competition implies a lower welfare
cost with respect to Cournot competition. However, under our baseline
calibration ( = 1) the Cournot competition provides a better welfare
performance. Nevertheless, as we have seen above, the dynamics in re-
sponse to a technology shock and the second moments are very similar
across the models.
5 Conclusions
We provided a DSGE model where rmsdynamics and matching fric-
tions in the labor market interact endogenously. We accounted for strate-
gic interactions in both prices and quantities among producers. The
interplay between search and matching frictions, endogenous entry and
strategic interactions among producers constitutes a strong amplica-
tion channel of technology shocks on labor market variables. Without
resorting to rigidities in wages (real or nominal) or prices, and under
a conservative and standard calibration of parameters, our framework
substantially outperforms the standard search and matching model at
replicating the observed variability of the unemployment rate, vacancies
and the job market tightness. Also, the model explains the procyclicality
of prots together with the countercyclicality of price mark ups.
Our analysis could be extended in various dimensions. One aspect we
neglect is the asymmetry between market competitors in terms of both
size and the probability of exit form the market. Davis et al. (2009)
document that the distribution of vacancy creation is strongly biased
in favor of small rms; Haltiwanger et al. (2009) show that younger
rms are more likely to exit from the market than more mature rms.
Another important aspect that we do not discuss is, as documented by
Davis et al. (2009), that a large fractions of new hires happens without
prior vacancy creation.
In ongoing research we extend our framework to a government sector
and analyze the transmission of government spending shocks to the labor
market. We believe that the strong propagation embodied in the model
with endogenous market structures could help resolving the unemploy-
ment scal multiplier puzzle emphasized in some recent contributions
without departing from a exible prices approach.
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Appendix
A. Analytical Details
The representative agent maximizes intertemporal utility (2) choosing how
much to invest in bonds and risky stocks out of labor and capital income.
We assume that household invest in both incumbent rms and new entrants.
Bonds and stocks are denominated in terms of an aggregate price index PAt .
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The budget constraint expressed in nominal terms is
PAt Bt+1 +
Z 1
0
PktCktdk +
+PAt
Z 1
0
VktNktskt+1dk + P
A
t
Z 1
0
V ektN
e
kts
e
kt+1dk
=WtLtht + (1  Lt)PAt b+ (1 + rt)PAt Bt +
+ (1  )PAt
Z 1
0
[kt(";Nkt) + Vkt]Nkt 1sktdk +
+ (1  )PAt
Z 1
0

FPkt (";Nkt) + Vkt

N ekt 1s
e
ktdk   PAt Tt (40)
where Bt is net bond holdings with interest rate rt, Vkt is the value of an
incumbent rm in sector k and V ekt is the value of a new entrant in sector k.
The variables Nkt and N ekt represent the number of active rms in sector k
and the new rms in this sector at the end of the period. The variable skt is
the share of the stock market value of the incumbent rms of sector k that
are owned by the agent while sekt is the share of portfolio of new entrants
held by the household. The term (1  )PAt
R 1
0
[kt(";Nkt) + Vkt]Nkt 1skt
represents the sum between the value of the portfolio of mature incumbent
rms held by the household and the prots distributed by these rms. Notice
that in period t there are (1  )Nkt 1 mature incumbent rms in each sec-
tor. The term (1  )PAt
R 1
0

FPkt (";Nkt) + Vkt

N ekt 1s
e
kt denotes the sum
between the value of the portfolio of rst period incumbent rms held by the
household and the prots distributed by these rms, where (1  )N ekt 1 is
the number of rst period producers at time t. Recall that the superscript
FP indicates variables relative to rst period incumbent rms. In the budget
constraint we have imposed the condition that V FPkt = Vkt i.e. symmetry
between incumbents. Finally PAt Tt represent nominal lump sum taxes im-
posed to nance unemployment benets. Equations ?? and 4 represents the
constraint to the utility maximization problem. We denote with t the La-
grangian multiplier of the rst constrain, while  t is the one of the second
constraint.
The intertemporal optimality conditions with respect to skt+1, sekt+1 for
each sector, and with respect to Bt+1 are:
PAt Vkt = Et (1  )
t+1
t
PAt+1 [kt+1(";Nkt+1) + Vkt+1] (41)
PAt V
e
kt = Et (1  )
t+1
t
PAt+1

FPkt+1(";Nkt+1) + Vkt+1

(42)
PAt t = Et(1 + rt+1)P
A
t+1t+1 (43)
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The optimal choice of consumption of the bundle of good produced in sector
k, Ckt, is instead
PktCkt = P
A
t Ct = EXPt for any k 2 [0; 1] (44)
the latter implies that nominal expenditure is identical in each sector and,
given sectors are atomistic with aggregate unit mass, that sector nominal
expenditure equals aggregate nominal expenditure, dened as EXPt. Also,
it follows that t =
1
PAt Ct
. Notice that  t has the meaning of the marginal
value to the household of having a member employed rather than unemployed.
The latter a¤ects bargaining over the real wage and individual hours and it
is given by
 t =
1
Ct
(wtht   b)   h
1+1='
t
1 + 1='
+ Et [(1  )   zt+1]  t+1 (45)
where wt =
Wt
PAt
is the real wage. Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we
adopt a probability  2 [0; 1] with which any rm can exit from the market
for exogenous reasons in each period. The dynamic equation determining the
number of rms in each sector is then:
Nkt+1 = (1  ) (Nkt +N ekt) 8k (46)
which provides the dynamic path for the average number of rms:
Nt+1 = (1  )
Z 1
0
(Nkt +N
e
kt) dk = (1  ) (Nt +N et ) (47)
where, of course, we have Nt 
R 1
0
Nktdk and N et 
R 1
0
N ektdk.
Market clearing in the asset markets requires Bt = 0 for any t in the
bond market, and skt = sekt = 1 for any sector k in the stock market. In
a symmetric equilibrium, the number of rms, the mark up and individual
prots are the same in every sector, which leads to the following equilibrium
relations:
Pkt = P
A
t Ckt = Ct 8k (48)
Vt = Ett;t+1 [t+1(";Nt+1) + Vt+1] (49)
V et = Ett;t+1

FPt+1(";Nt+1) + Vt+1

(50)
C 1t = (1 + rt+1)E
 
C 1t+1

(51)
The variable t;t+1 =  (1  ) CtCt+1 represents the households stochastic
discount factor, which takes into account that a rm exits from the market
with probability .
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B. Proofs of Propositions
B1. Proposition 1
Proof. Notice thatCk;t(i) =

pk;t(i)
Pk;t
 "
Ck;t =
p "k;t(i)
(Pk;t)
1 "Pk;tCk;t =
p "k;t(i)
(Pk;t)
1 "EXPk;t =
p "k;t(i)
(Pk;t)
1 "EXPt: Since
Pk;t =
"
NtX
j=1
pk;t(j)
 (" 1)
#  1
" 1
(52)
we can write the demand faced by rm i as
Ck;t(i) =
pk;t(i)
 "EXPt24Nk;tX
j=1
pk;t(j) (" 1)
35 (53)
Each sector can be similarly described, so we drop the index referring to
sectors and consider a representative sector. Substituting the direct demand
for the individual good into period t real prots, we obtain
t =
pt(i)
1 ""
NtX
j=1
pt(j) (" 1)
#EXPt
PAt
  wt (i)nt (i)ht (i)  kvt (i) (54)
The prot maximization problem of a mature producer reads as
max
fpt(i);nt(i);vt(i)g1t
t + Et
1X
s=t+1
t;ss (55)
subject to
Atnt (i)ht(i) =
pt(i)
 "EXPt"
NtX
j=1
pt(j) (" 1)
# (56)
nt (i) = nt 1 (i) + vt (i) qt (57)
Lagrangian multipliers on constraints (56), and (57) are respectivelymct (i) and
t (i). Setting up the Lagrangian L, the FOCs for prot maximization are
@L
@nt (i)
= 0 : wt (i)ht (i) + t (i) mct (i)Atht (i) = %Ett;t+1t+1 (i)
(58)
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@L
@vt (i)
= 0 : k = t (i) qt (59)
@L
@pt (i)
= 0 :
(1  ")
"
NtX
j=1
pt(j)
 (" 1)
#
  (1  ") pt(i)1 ""
NtX
j=1
pt(j)1 "
#2 pt(i) "EXPtPAt +(60)
mct (i)
"pt(i)
 1
"
NtX
j=1
pt(j)
 (" 1)
#
+ (1  ") pt(i) ""
NtX
j=1
pt(j)1 "
#2 pt(i) "EXPt
= 0
Note that we assumed that rms take individual wages as given when
choosing employment. The second condition shows that t (i), the surplus
created by a match, is identical across mature incumbent rms. Before provid-
ing an explicit formula for the individual price level and the price mark up, we
turn to the prot maximization problem of a rst period incumbent producer
which sets the price for the rst time. The relevant di¤erence with respect to
the previous case is represented by the form of constraint (57) which reads as
vt (i) qt = nt (i), since producers in their rst period of activity have no stock
initial workforce. However, FOCs with respect to pt(i), nt (i) and vt (i) are
identical to those reported above. Since the surplus t created by a match
is identical across incumbent rms, they will face the same wage bargaining
problem, thus will face the same wage, wt (i) = wt, the same marginal cost,
mct (i) = mct, and will demand the same amount of hours, ht (i) = ht. As
a result the third condition can be written as
(1  ")P 1 "t   (1  ") pt (i)1 " = MCt

"pt (i)
 1 P 1 "t + (1  ") pt (i) "

(61)
whereMCt
 
= PAt mct

is the nominal marginal cost, which shows that pt (i)
does not depend on any rm specic variable. In other words all incumbent
rms, no matter the period of entry, choose the same price. Since rms face
the same demand function and adopt the same technology, it follows that
yt (i) = yt and nt (i) = nt: We are now ready to provide an expression
for the common price chosen by rms. Given rms choose the same price
level, it follows that PAt = Pt =
"
NtX
j=1
pt(j)
 (" 1)
#  1
" 1
= N
1
1 "
t pt. Imposing
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symmetry and rearranging, condition 3 can be rewritten as
pt = 
P
t MCt (62)
where
Pt =
" (Nt   1) + 1
("  1) (Nt   1) (63)
B2. Proposition 2
Proof. The main di¤erence with the proof of proposition 1 is that prot
maximization must take the inverse demand function as a constraint. The
latter is
pt(i) =
yt(i)
  1
"EXPt
NtX
j=1
yt(j)
" 1
"
(64)
which implies that period prots can be written as
t =
yt(i)
1  1
"
NtX
j=1
yt(j)
" 1
"
EXPt
PAt
  wt (i)nt (i)ht (i)  kvt (i) (65)
and constraint 56 is replaced by Atnt (i)ht(i) = yt (i). We proceed as above
and initially consider the problem of a mature incumbent. Setting up a La-
grangian function as in the proof of Proposition 1 and di¤erencing with respect
to yt(i); nt (i) ; vt (i), it can be easily veried that the FOCs with respect to
nt (i) ; vt (i) are unchanged with respect to the Bertrand case. Turning to
the problem of a rst period incumbent rm, it can be veried that the con-
sideration made under Bertrand competition extend to this case. Incumbent
rms, independently of the period of entry, face the same marginal cost and
assign the same value to the marginal worker. In particular, notice that the
FOC with respect to yt (i) reads as
" 1
"
yt(i)
  1
"
NtX
j=1
yt(i)
" 1
"   " 1
"
yt(i)
" 2
"
"
NtX
j=1
yt(j)
" 1
"
#2 EXPtPAt = mct (66)
which shows that individual production is not rms specic. Imposing sym-
metry and rearranging leads to the individual output
yt =
"  1
"
Nt   1
N2t
EXPt
MCt
(67)
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Substituting the latter into the inverse demand function, after imposing sym-
metry, we get
pt =
EXPt
Nt
yt
 1 =
EXPt
Nt
"N2tMCt
("  1) (Nt   1)EXPt = 
Q
t MCt (68)
where
Qt =
"
("  1)
Nt
(Nt   1) (69)
B3. Proposition 3
Proof. Since all incumbent rms are, under both forms of competition,
characterized by the same size, rst period incumbent rms, which have no
initial workforce, must post at time t as many vacancies as required to reach
the size of a mature incumbent producer. Given the time-t workforce of a
rst period incumbent is vFPt qt = nt, i) follows. To prove ii) notice that
FPt =
pt
Pt
yt   wthtnt   kvFPt =
pt
Pt
yt   wthtnt   knt
qt
(70)
Since it also holds that nt = nt 1 + vtqt the latter can be written as
FPt =
pt
Pt
yt   wthtnt   k%nt 1 + vtqt
qt
=
pt
Pt
yt   wthtnt   kvt| {z }
t
  k%nt 1
qt
=t   k%nt 1
qt
(71)
B4. Proposition 4
Proof. The value of a new entrant reads as
V et = Ett;t+1
NP
t+1 + Et
1X
s=t+2
t;ss = Ett;t+1
 
NPt+1 + Vt+1

(72)
Proposition 3 implies that
NPt+1 = t+1   k
%nt
qt+1
(73)
Using the latter into (72) it follows
V et = Ett;t+1

t+1   k %nt
qt+1

+ Ett;t+1Vt+1 (74)
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Notice that the value of an incumbent rm must satisfy the recursive equation
Vt = Ett;t+1 (t+1 + Vt+1) (75)
Substituting the latter into (74) we obtain equation (20). A similar result
can be obtained combining equations (50) and (49) and using the result in
Proposition 3.
C. Equilibrium Conditions
In what follows we list the equilibrium conditions of the model. The denition
of aggregate employment is
Lt = Ntnt (76)
Since PtYt = Ntptyt and t =
Pt
pt
it follows that aggregate output reads as
Yt = tNtyt = tAtLtht (77)
In equilibrium Bt = Bt 1 = 0 and st = st+1 = set+1 = 1. Further since
the Government runs a balanced budget it follows that Gt = b (1  Lt) = Tt
and the aggregate resource constraint reads as
Ct + V
e
t N
e
t = WtLtht + (1  )Nt 1t + (1  )N et 1NPt (78)
Goods market clearing requires
Yt = Ct +N
E
t  + kv
tot
t (79)
where
vtott = (1  )Nt 1vt + (1  )N et 1vNPt (80)
and
vNPt =
nt (i)
qt
(81)
The motion of the number of rms reads as
Nt = (1  )
 
Nt 1 +NEt 1

(82)
while the dynamic of aggregate employment
Lt = (1  ) %Lt 1 + qtvtott (83)
The JCC
k
qt
= (mctAt   wt)ht + %Ett;t+1 k
qt+1
(84)
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where
qt =
mt
vtott
(85)
The denition of the households stochastic discount factor is
t;t+1 = (1  ) 

Ct+1
Ct
 1
(86)
The wage schedule reads
wt = (1  ) b+ mctAt + (1  ) Cth
1='
t
1 + 1='
+ kEt
Ct=ht
Ct+1
t+1 (87)
where job market tightness is dened as
t =
vtott
ut
(88)
Hours worked satisfy
ht =

1

t
t
At
Ct
'
(89)
The mark up function depends of the form of competition; for Bertrand com-
petition we have
Pt =
" (Nt   1) + 1
("  1) (Nt   1) (90)
while under Cournot Competition
Qt =
"Nt
("  1) (Nt   1) (91)
Next we have to consider three Euler equations; the one for bonds
1
Ct
= (1 + rt)Et

1
Ct+1

(92)
that for shares of incumbent rms
Vt = Ett;t+1 (t+1 + Vt+1) (93)
and nally the Euler equation for shares in new entrants
V et = Ett;t+1

t+1   k%nt+1
qt+1
+ Vt+1

(94)
Next we consider the pricing equation
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mct =
t
t
=
N
1
" 1
t
(95)
and the denition of prots of incumbent rms which have been in the market
for more than a period
t =
pt
Pt
yt (i)  wtntLt   kvt (i) (96)
The total number of matches is
mt = m (ut)
  vtott 1  ; (97)
where the denition of the unemployment rate is
ut = 1  Lt 1 (98)
Finally we have to take into account the entry condition
V et =  (99)
and the denition of the job nding rate
zt =
mt
ut
(100)
The equilibrium contains 24 equations for 25 variables: 24 endogenous
variables Yt; Lt; nt; ht; Ct; mt; qt; zt; t; N et ; Nt; v
tot
t ; v
NP
t ; v
e
t ; mct; wt;
t;t+1; t; rt; Vt; t; ut; V
e
t ; t and 1 exogenous variable, At. In addition the
equilibrium features 13 parameters: ; m; ; ; %; ; ', ; ; "; b; A and
 .
D. Steady State
Given the restrictions reported in the text, the steady state can be obtained
as follows. By denition q = m
vtot
= m
  , thus m = q
 and z = m
u
=
m
1  . To pin down the steady state rate of unemployment notice that
vtot = u =  (1  L). Substituting for total vacancies into the steady state
counterpart of equation (83) leads to
L= (1  ) %L+ qvtot = (1  ) %L+ q (1  L)
=
q
1  (1  ) %+ q (101)
As a consequence we can determine
vFP = (1  ) N
e
N
L
q
= 
L
q
(102)
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u =
1  (1  ) %
1  (1  ) %+ q : (103)
and
v = vtot vFP (104)
Notice that b = b
w
w; where we calibrate the ratio b
w
. Evaluating the wage
schedule and the JJC at the steady state leads respectively to
wh =

1  (1  ) b
w
 1 


Ah+ (1  )C h
1+1='
1 + 1='
+ 

(105)
and
wh = mcAh  (1  % (1  ) ) 
q
(106)
Combining the latter two equations, after substituting for  = 

A
C
h 1=',
delivers the cost of posting a vacancy, k, as a function of the number of rms
 =
1   1  (1  ) b
w
 1 +'
1+'

(1 %(1 ))
q
+
 
1  (1  ) b
w
 1



Ah (107)
The value of k increasing with the extent of competition since 

is an in-
creasing function of N. The same holds for the steady state wage, given by
w = mcA  (1  % (1  ) ) 
hq
Combining the steady state counterparts of equations (78) and (79) delivers
Y = wLh+ (1  )Nt 1t + (1  )N et 1NPt + kvtot (108)
where  =
 
 (N)  w
A

AL
N
  (1  ) k
q
L
N
, V = 1 

 and NP =  

  V =
 

  
1 . Substituting the denitions of ; V and 
e into (108) delivers
and equation which can be solved for N. Our numerical analysis shows that
the latter has a unique solution for N>1.
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